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| Registros recuperados: 22 | |
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| Lankoski, Jussi E.; Lichtenberg, Erik; Ollikainen, Markku. |
| Heterogeneity of agricultural landscapes may necessitate the use of spatially targeted instrument combinations to implement the social optimum. But compliance with these policies may require costly enforcement. This paper examines the design of agri-environmental policies featuring two of the most commonly used instruments, reductions in fertilizer application rates and installation of riparian buffers. While compliance with buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost, fertilizer application is only verifiable through costly monitoring. We derive optimal subsidies for fertilizer reduction and buffer strip set-asides and enforcement strategies for the cases of low and excessive monitoring costs. An empirical simulation model suggests that... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Nutrient runoff; Monitoring; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44381 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382 |
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| D'Amato, Alessio; Valentini, Edilio. |
| This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not sufficient... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions Trading; Environmental Federalism; Enforcement; Monitoring Cost; Environmental Economics and Policy; F18; K42; Q53. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46654 |
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| Stranlund, John K.. |
| Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply. In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967 |
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| Kerr, William A.. |
| There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Incentives; Intellectual property; Knowledge economy; Threats; TRIPS; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23815 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. |
| We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 |
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| Registros recuperados: 22 | |
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